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CASEBOOK REVIEW
REFLECTION
Why Constitutional Torts Deserve a
Book of Their Own
Michael Wells,* Thomas A. Eaton,*#and
Sheldon H. Nahmod'
Over thirty years ago, Marshall Shapo coined the term "constitutional tort" to denote a suit brought against an official, charging a
constitutional violation and seeking damages.' In the years since
Shapo's pathbreaking article, the number of such suits has grown
exponentially.' The suits have generated a host of new substantive
and remedial issues, yet conventional casebooks on constitutional law
and federal courts give little attention to the area. That Professor
Shapiro had four books to include in his review of "Civil Rights"
casebooks in the Seattle University Law Review is some indication of
a demand for teaching materials currently unmet by federal courts and
constitutional law casebook offerings.' The premise of our book4 is
that "constitutional torts" present a sufficiently large and complex
group of problems to warrant a casebook and a course of their own.
We will first discuss why constitutional tort issues tend to receive
inadequate attention in courses and casebooks on constitutional law and
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2. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECLSHER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1121-22 (4th ed. 1996).

3. Stephen Shapiro, The Right Books for the "Rights" Course: A Review of Four Civil Rights
Casebooks, 21 U. SEATTLE L. REV. 789 (1998) [hereinafter cited as Shapiro, Book Review].
4.

SHELDON H. NAHMOD ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS (1995).
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other civil rights topics. Then we will explain the pedagogic advantages of having a separate offering on constitutional torts.
I.

THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS AND
OTHER CIVIL RIGHTS TOPICS

The case for a separate course in constitutional torts rests, in part,
on the distinctive features of constitutional tort law, which set it apart
from other aspects of public law. Broadly speaking, the constitutional
torts course does not primarily address the substantive content of
constitutional rights, but rather some of the remedies available for their
violation.
Within the universe of constitutional remedies, it is useful to
distinguish between offensive and defensive remedies. A defensive
remedy is the use of the Constitution as a shield against a civil or
criminal enforcement action, as where a criminal defendant, charged
with violation of a statute prohibiting the distribution of pornography,
asserts that the statute violates the First Amendment. Offensive
remedies concern the use of the Constitution as a sword, with the
claimant taking the role of plaintiff rather than defendant, pursuing the
government or an official for relief. There are two kinds of offensive
remedies. One may sue to obtain prospective relief, such as an
injunction or a declaratory judgment to prevent current or future harm,
or retrospective relief, such as an action for damages to compensate for
a past wrong. Suits for damages, generally brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, are the domain of constitutional tort.'
Distinguishing between rights and remedies and among various
kinds of remedies, helps to define the appropriate domains of courses
on constitutional law, federal courts, and constitutional torts. To begin
with, there are good pedagogic reasons for separate courses on
constitutional law and constitutional remedies. Constitutional law
casebooks rightly emphasize the broad themes of constitutional
structure and individual rights. The proliferation of doctrine on
constitutional rights means that giving adequate attention to their
breadth and depth will, and should be, the highest priority in basic
constitutional law courses. Treatments of the First Amendment, for
example, should introduce students to the history and theory of free
speech and the Supreme Court's various methodologies for dealing
with free speech claims. Many basic Constitutional Law courses must
cover not only constitutional rights, but also separation of powers and

5. As are Bivens actions, which are constitutional tort claims against federal officials. See
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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federalism issues. Given the number and importance of these issues
of structure and substance, it is hardly surprising to find that
constitutional law casebooks devote little space to remedial issues in
general and even less to the remedial issues that typically arise in
constitutional tort suits. In the Gunther and Sullivan book, for
example, one finds virtually nothing about such crucial remedial
issues
6
as official immunity, the measure of damages, and causation.
Courses on federal courts typically devote much time to remedial
issues, and the Low and Jeffries Civil Rights Actions book,7 itself an
outgrowth of a federal courts book,8 addresses both prospective and
retrospective remedies. Our view is that Low and Jeffries do a fine job
with prospective remedies, but do so at the expense of a thorough
coverage of constitutional torts. Both the strengths and weaknesses of
the book are products of its federal courts roots. For both historical
and pedagogic reasons, federal courts casebooks mainly address
prospective and (to a lesser extent) defensive remedies, giving little
attention to the distinctive problems that arise in suits for retrospective
relief.
The modern Federal Courts course is a product of two postWorld War II developments: the rise of the Legal Process movement
in the 1950s and the Warren Court activism in the 1950s and 1960s. 9
The Legal Process school of jurisprudence produced Federal Courts'
leadiig casebook, Henry Hart and Herbert Wechsler's The Federal
Courts and the Federal System," ° and an agenda that emphasized the
allocation of decision-making power between the federal and state
governments and among the branches of the national government
through such doctrines as sovereign immunity, abstention, justiciability, ripeness, mootness, standing, and equitable discretion. These
doctrines are mainly relevant to suits for prospective relief and have
particular importance in broadly-framed suits seeking to reform
institutions. Warren Court decisions on such matters as school

6. See GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (13th

ed. 1997).
7. PETER W. Low & JOHN CALVIN JEFFRIES, JR., CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS: SECTION
1983 AND RELATED STATUTES (2nd ed. 1994).
8. PETER W. Low & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF

FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS (4th ed. 1998).
9. See Michael Wells, Behind the Parity Debate: The Decline of the Legal Process Tradition
in the Law of Federal Courts, 71 B.U. L. REV. 609, 617-36 (1991).
10. The book is now in its fourth edition. See supra note 2.
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desegregation and reapportionment opened the doors of the federal
courts to such litigation.11
It is appropriate for Federal Courts courses to stress the many
issues related to prospective remedies. Beginning with sovereign
immunity, and continuing on with the Ex parte Young 12 lawsuit
against state officials for prospective relief, Pullman and Younger"
abstention, and the various justiciability doctrines that define the kinds
of disputes federal courts will hear, one encounters common themes of
governmental accountability, the role of courts as agents of social
change, and the proper relationship between federal courts and state
governments. Yet there is little time in such a course to discuss the
seemingly pedestrian tort law issues that arise in constitutional damages
actions. Perhaps for this reason, the authors of federal courts books
give short shrift to constitutional torts. They contain the major
Supreme Court cases, scholarly commentary on the central issues in the
area, and little else.' 4
One problem with such an approach is that the Supreme Court
has decided comparatively few constitutional tort cases. Teachers of
public law courses, accustomed to finding nearly everything they need
in the corpus of Supreme Court opinions, may be surprised to learn
that, on a number of important constitutional tort topics, the Supreme
Court has had little to say. For example, there is just one important
Supreme Court opinion on cause-in-fact in the constitutional tort
context" and only two opinions on damages. 6 Yet issues on these
topics often arise in the course of constitutional tort litigation and must
be addressed by lower courts. Excluding lower court cases on these
topics has the effect of depriving students of the opportunity to learn
about the reality of constitutional tort litigation. Even where the
Supreme Court has spoken repeatedly, as with official immunity, a host
of key issues has been left to the lower courts and, therefore, can only
be taught effectively by studying lower court cases. The Supreme
Court's immunity cases state the law in highly abstract terms: an

11.

See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483

(1954).

12. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
13. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496
(1941).
14. See, e.g., FALLON, supra note 2, at 1111-84; ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., FEDERAL
COURTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 815-931 (1996); HOWARD P. FINK ET AL., FEDERAL
COURTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 256-76 (1996).

15. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
16. Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986); Carey v. Piphus,
435 U.S. 247 (1978).
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official exercising executive functions is immune unless the official
violated "clearly established law."17 One can have no idea what this
means without examining its application by the lower courts, as we do
in our casebook. "Clearly established law" means different things in
different contexts18 and in different courts. 19
Consequently, there are significant practical obstacles to trying to
teach the subject of constitutional torts effectively while fitting it into
a course that emphasizes substantive constitutional law or prospective
remedies.
A potential solution, adopted in the Abernathy and Eisenberg
casebooks,2 ° is to separately teach constitutional torts with modern
federal statutes forbidding discrimination on the basis of race, gender,
age, disability, and so on. However, while these statutes share some
common themes with Section 1983, they have generated complex and
distinctive bodies of law that, in our view, deserve separate treatment
in the law school curriculum.

II.

PEDAGOGIC CONSIDERATIONS

A primary concern of authors who craft a casebook is whether
other professors will understand the authors' teaching objectives. Most
authors strive to present materials clearly, but without spoonfeeding
students. They want to include materials that stimulate thought and
discussion without being too obscure. A major challenge is to strike
the proper balance between being clear and leaving the student with
challenging questions to contemplate. Professor Shapiro's comments
are a welcomed reassurance that we achieved some success in this
regard. Of course, we tried to organize and present the material in a
"straightforward way,"'" hoped that our notes would be "focused"
and "thought provoking,"2 2 and are pleased that Professor Shapiro

17. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
18. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA.
L. REV. 47, 81 (1998).
19. Compare Jenkins v. Talledega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821, 826-27 n.4 (1lth Cir.
1997) (seemingly requiring authority directly on point in order to defeat qualified immunity) with
Sweaney v. Ada County, 119 F.3d 1385, 1389 (9th Cir. 1997) (denying that absence of authority
directly on point is necessarily fatal to a claim).
20. CHARLES F. ABERNATHY, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION (2nd
ed. 1992); THEODORE EISENBERG, CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th

ed. 1996).
21. See Shapiro, Book Review, supra note 3, at 804 (stating the material in our book is
presented and organized in a straightforward way).
22. See id. at 800 (stating that our notes are thought-provoking and more focused than
Abemathy's).
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agrees that our expanded use of appellate cases "makes a lot of
sense. "23
Professor Shapiro correctly observes that our focus is on the
enforcement, primarily through actions for damages, rather than on the
substance of constitutional rights. 24 The availability of a damage
remedy is the main reason why Section 1983 actions are commonly
called "constitutional torts." As discussed in the preceding section,
Section 1983 is an important body of law often left out of, or only
briefly covered in, courses on torts, constitutional law, and federal
courts. This would be reason enough to justify a separate course in
and casebook on the subject. But there are additional pedagogic
reasons why we believe such a course and casebook is warranted.
One valid criticism of the traditional law school curriculum is that
the courses tend to divide law into discrete doctrinal compartments.
Students learn about causation in their course on torts. They may
study about claim and issue preclusion in courses on civil procedure.
Most Constitutional Law courses are hard-pressed to survey substantive doctrine and have little time to spend on remedies. There are
good reasons why most law school courses tend to have narrow
doctrinal foci. One simply cannot teach (or learn) everything at once.
First year courses provide foundations upon which other and increasingly more complex subjects are developed. Moreover, in any course
there are choices to be made between depth and breadth of coverage.
Time spent covering the nuances of damage remedies for violations of
constitutional rights can come only at the expense of covering
substantive constitutional law. Most professors choose to concentrate
on substantive doctrine, so students spend most of their time studying
a series of seemingly discrete individual trees in the forest of law.
The practice of law, however, is not so readily compartmentalized.
In representing real clients, practicing attorneys must integrate their
knowledge of substantive law, remedies, and procedure. A course in
constitutional torts provides an exceptional opportunity for students to
integrate what they have learned in a number of other courses. At its
core, Section 1983 litigation incorporates elements of torts, constitutional law, federal courts, civil procedure, and remedies. A course in
constitutional torts, in other words, allows students to focus on the
forest instead of the trees.

23. Id. at 804.
24. Id.
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Professor Shapiro noted that our casebook "may also be suitable
for a paper or project course. '"25 This is precisely what we do in our
courses. One approach that we have used is to incorporate practiceoriented exercises at the end of the course. In recent years, we have
assigned students projects in drafting complaints, in preparing and
responding to motions for summary judgment based on an assertion of
qualified immunity, in preparing jury instructions, and in drafting an
application for attorney's fees. Resources for such projects are readily
at hand. Treatises on Section 1983 litigation and more traditional form
books can help guide students through the initially awkward stages of
drafting.26 Practicing attorneys have been exceedingly generous in
sharing pleadings and other documents from actual cases to provide the
substantive basis for these exercises. One purpose of these exercises
is to demonstrate concretely how theory and doctrine translate into real
world practice.
Another approach would be to require a more traditional paper on
matters of contemporary interest. Topics of such papers could include
when law is "clearly settled" for purposes of qualified immunity,2 7 the
standard of proving a governmental policy or custom after Board of the
County Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown,28 interlocutory
appeals of denials of motions for summary judgment on grounds of
qualified immunity after Johnson v. Jones,29 or the scope of qualified
immunity in improper motive cases after Crawford-El v. Britton.3 °
These and a host of other recent cases can provide a springboard into
thoughtful and productive scholarly papers.31
A separate course in constitutional torts also allows for detailed
consideration of important issues of statutory and constitutional
interpretation. The text of Section 198332 is quite short and the

25.

Id. at 804-05.

26. See, e.g., SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION:
THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 (4th ed. 1997); MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ AND JOHN E. KIRKLIN,

SECTION 1983 LITIGATION:

STATUTORY ATTORNEY'S FEES (3d ed. 1997); JOHN WITT ET

AL., SECTION 1983 LITIGATION FORMS (1994).

27. See, e.g., supra note 17.
28. 520 U.S. 397 (1997).
29. 515 U.S. 304 (1995).
30. 118 S.Ct. 1584 (1998).
31. One of us, Sheldon Nahmod, has also used the casebook for two and three hour examcourses in constitutional torts.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979) reads as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
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legislative history does not address most modem constitutional tort
issues.33 Substantive constitutional law looks very different in the
1990s than it did when Section 1983 was enacted in 1871. How
should a court purport to apply this remedial statute to issues that are
not explicitly resolved by the text of the statute and, perhaps, were not
even considered by the legislature at the time of enactment? To what
extent do or should text, history, and perceptions of modern policy
drive the development of Section 1983 doctrine? These questions
pervade the Supreme Court's treatment of immunity34 and municipal
liability issues.3 5 They are also issues on which the Justices and legal
commentators diverge in opinion.36
As the label implies, constitutional tort claims raise substantive
constitutional law issues and tort issues of a nonconstitutional nature.
To what extent does or should one influence the other? For example,
does the constitutional underpinning of the substantive right support
the adoption of rules of damages37 and causation 38 that are different
from those applied in common law torts? In fact, causation and
damages issues present subtly different problems when the source of
the rights is the Constitution. Rules made in the general tort context
and based on the general policies underlying tort law are not necessarily appropriate for the constitutional tort.
Consider, for example, the black-letter tort rule that the plaintiff
must prove damages in order to recover them.39 This rule makes
perfect sense in the context of the ordinary tort, where the most
pressing concern is to provide justice to victims of physical injury
inflicted by negligence. The harm in such a case is normally easy to
identify. On the other hand, when the breach of duty is a constitu-

laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of
the District of Columbia.
33. See Michael Wells, The Past and the Future of Constitutional Torts: From Statutory
Interpretationto Common Law Rules, 19 CONN. L. REV. 53, 65-68 (1986).
34. See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800 (1982).
35. See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989); Monell v. New York City
Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
36. For a detailed discussion of this point, see Crawford-El v. Britton, 118 S. Ct. 1584
(1998).
37. See, e.g., Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986); Carey
v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
38. See, e.g., Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980); Mt. Healthy City School Dist.
Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912 (1977).
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tional violation, the harm may be exceedingly abstract. The blackletter common law tort rule may present an insurmountable obstacle
to people who, having wrongfully been denied a parade permit, seek to
vindicate their free speech rights. Bringing out distinctions of this kind
requires a book that specializes in constitutional torts, rather than one
that treats them merely as a vehicle for enforcing substantive constitutional rights or as an auxiliary to prospective remedies.
A converse problem is whether the content of nonconstitutional
doctrine should have an impact on the definition of substantive
constitutional rights. Consider, for example, the argument that the
availability of a damage remedy under state tort law should be taken
into account in defining the scope of substantive federal constitutional
rights. 41 On a number of occasions, the Supreme Court has prefaced
a ruling that there had been no violation of substantive constitutional
rights by observing that the plaintiff could seek redress under state tort
law.4 Such opinions certainly suggest that the scope of substantive
federal constitutional rights may be influenced by state tort law. The
doctrine on these matters is complex and controversial and is more
likely to be fully developed in a course on constitutional torts than in
a course on constitutional law or federal courts.
There are a variety of pedagogic justifications for a separate course
and casebook on constitutional torts. The number of reported Section
1983 cases appearing in the advance sheets speaks to the subject's
immense practical importance. At the same time, a separate course
offers an attractive vehicle for integrating various bodies of law and
invites detailed discussions on statutory and constitutional interpretation.

40. Michael Wells, Constitutional Torts, Common Law Torts, and Due Process of Law, 72
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 617, 624-26 (1997).
41. See, e.g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled in part on other grounds by
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979); Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
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